Why is there so much fake news? We’ve talked about this in the past - including, in
TiB 81, the idea that some people just want to watch the watch the world burn.
A new paper by Michael Thaler, though, suggests an interesting hypothesis: if
consumers of news want their news sources to be truthful, but also believe that information that contradicts their political beliefs is less true,
producers of news are incentivised to disseminate fake news precisely because they want to be seen as honest! I will leave examples as an exercise for the reader, but I’m sure you can think of some, wherever you stand politically.
Thaler designs two experiments to evidence this. In the first, he shows that people are significantly more likely to communicate messages they know to be false when (a) they know that the receiver’s political party has an ideological preference for the false narrative and (b) they are being incentivised based on the receiver’s evaluation of their truthfulness. In the second, he shows that people who are incentivised to be perceived as truthful will pay to find out about their receiver’s political party when sending messages on political topics, but not when sharing news on neutral topics. In other words, disseminating fake news is (sadly) rational if audiences prefer media companies they perceive as truthful(!)
This is obviously bad news. And it strongly suggests that it’s too simplistic to blame social - or even traditional - media companies for fake news. In a world where many consumers actually prefer fake news, “bad” actors who are willing to supply it will outcompete “good” actors who are not, which is not a great equilibrium. As Thaler says, one avenue to explore is how to change the incentives of the suppliers of news, but this seems tricky. Another is to find ways to reduce the role of motivated reasoning in how consumers evaluate the quality of news. Also tricky! Regulation clearly has a role to play, but this paper suggests there are no easy answers.